Your Way Out
The United Nations is imperfect. It was built by the same powers that colonized you, and some of its institutions reflect that history. But the UN also built specific organs, designed specifically for situations like yours, that have the authority, the precedent, and the mandate to recognize what was done and to demand remedy. Those organs are open. The cases are filed. The 1836 Treaty of Peace and Friendship — which the US Congress calls the longest unbroken diplomatic relationship in American history — carries obligations the United States has not honored once in 190 years. The international record is how that breach is corrected.
Seven filings across four international forums are already submitted. You are already before the international record. This is not a plan. It is a record.
Every international body asks the same two questions: is this a real claim, and can we hear it? On every point, the answer is built from one source, the United States' own records. The threshold is not met with testimony. It is buried under the government's own paper.
Each forum below publishes its own requirements for a claim to be heard. This is what each one requires, and how the record does not merely satisfy it but exceeds it.
How the record exceeds it: the petition qualifies for all three exhaustion exceptions at once, when only one is required. There is no domestic forum for a treaty claim that predates the Constitution. More than 25 named officials in apex positions were structurally prevented from acting on it across 60 years. And the claim has been blocked for 67 years since the 1959 Note. The claim is not merely colorable, it is assembled entirely from the government's own records: FRUS, the 1952 International Court of Justice judgment confirming the treaty in force, and H.Res.251.
How the record exceeds it: the petition is already in the record. The reclassification of a treaty-recognized people across 13 documented name changes is a textbook Resolution 1514 situation, a people moved out of their national status by an administering power without their consent.
How the record exceeds it: the communication is filed and receipted, and it engages more than one mandate at once, Contemporary Forms of Racism, Indigenous Peoples, and Minority Issues, each on primary-source documentation rather than allegation.
How the record exceeds it: the name chain is Article 1 discrimination in its purest documented form, a distinction of race and national origin imposed through the government's own census and statute record.
The pattern holds across every forum: the bar is set at a credible claim, and the record answers with the respondent's own admissions, on every point, past what any single requirement demands.
The UN Special Committee on Decolonization, C24, was created specifically to address situations like yours. A petition is already in the record.
The UN Special Committee on Decolonization, known as C24, is the UN body mandated to implement Resolution 1514 (1960), the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and Resolution 1541 (1961), which defines the criteria for determining whether a territory is non-self-governing. C24 receives petitions from civil society organizations, individuals, and states. A petition has already been filed and is in the record.
C24's strongest possible outcome for the treaty class is a resolution finding that the treaty class constitutes a non-self-governing people entitled to self-determination, and recommending that the United States engage in decolonization negotiations with the treaty class as a recognized people under international law. C24 resolutions are not binding, but they create an international political record. They trigger General Assembly debate. They authorize the UN's decolonization reporting mechanism to document the situation. And they establish the legal precedent in the international record that a UN body has recognized the claim.
C24 has recognized Puerto Rico's right to self-determination in a resolution every year since 1972. The United States has not complied. But those resolutions created a legal record that has supported 54 years of ongoing international documentation of Puerto Rico's colonial status. This claim is legally stronger, there is an operative bilateral treaty, confirmed by the ICJ in 1952, that Puerto Rico's decolonization argument does not have.— Moroccan Treaty Research: What Winning Looks Like, 2026
C24 is the forum where the decolonization argument gets its first formal international recognition, and that recognition is the foundation for everything that follows.
IACHR rulings are non-binding, but they have been cited in US federal courts for 20 years after the fact. A favorable ruling today creates legal authority you can use in any US court tomorrow.
In 2002, the IACHR issued a merits decision in the case of Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States (Case 11.140), the Western Shoshone Nation's challenge to the US government's failure to recognize their land rights under an 1863 treaty. The IACHR found that the United States had violated the American Declaration by failing to recognize Western Shoshone land rights under an operative treaty. The US did not comply with the ruling.
But here is what happened next: the Dann decision was cited in US federal courts for the following 20 years as persuasive authority, international human rights standards informing the interpretation of treaty rights in domestic litigation. Non-binding international decisions shape binding domestic law when they are used correctly. As of 2022, the IACHR noted that implementation was still pending, but the legal record the decision created was used actively in litigation for two decades.
The parallel here is stronger. The 1836 Treaty is older than the 1863 Shoshone treaty. It is more clearly "still in force", the US government's own Congressional record calls it "the longest unbroken diplomatic relationship in United States history" (H.Res.251, 2025). It was confirmed operative by the International Court of Justice in 1952. It applies to a larger class. A favorable IACHR merits decision in IACHR P-1365-26 would create a legal record at least as powerful as the Dann decision, applied to a treaty the US government currently acknowledges as its oldest and most continuously maintained.
Article 15 of the 1880 Madrid Convention applies directly to the treaty class. The United States is a foreign sovereign. Empire of Morocco subjects were subjected to US nationality laws without the consent of the Government of Morocco. Under Article 15's own terms, Empire of Morocco nationality survives that naturalization by default. The consent that was required was never given. The protection was never lawfully terminated.
The Convention on the Right of Protection in Morocco was signed at Madrid on July 3, 1880, ratified by the United States Senate on May 5, 1881, ratified by the President on May 10, 1881, and proclaimed December 21, 1881. It is a Senate-ratified treaty of the United States (22 Stat. 817; Treaty Series 246). The Sultan of Morocco signed it. Thirteen nations signed it. Article 15 is the nationality survival clause: the provision establishing that no foreign naturalization of an Empire of Morocco subject could extinguish that subject's Empire of Morocco nationality without the Government of Morocco's explicit consent.
"Any subject of Morocco who has been naturalized in a foreign country, and who shall return to Morocco, shall after having remained for a length of time equal to that which shall have been regularly necessary for him to obtain such naturalization, choose between entire submission to the laws of the Empire and the obligation to quit Morocco, unless it shall be proved that his naturalization in a foreign country was obtained with the consent of the Government of Morocco."
"Foreign naturalization heretofore acquired by subjects of Morocco according to the rules established by the laws of each country, shall be continued to them as regards all its effects, without any restriction."
The United States is a recognized foreign sovereign — the 1836 Treaty of Peace and Friendship itself establishes the Empire of Morocco and the United States as two distinct sovereigns in bilateral relationship. The treaty class were Empire of Morocco subjects subjected to the nationality laws of that foreign sovereign: the 1662 British colonial partus sequitur ventrem law enacted on Empire of Morocco land, and the 1868 14th Amendment imposed by the US government across the treaty class as a whole. This is the Article 15 scenario exactly: Empire of Morocco subjects naturalized in a foreign country. Article 15's answer is unambiguous — Empire of Morocco nationality survives by default. The sole exception, "unless it shall be proved that his naturalization in a foreign country was obtained with the consent of the Government of Morocco," was never triggered. The consent of the Empire of Morocco was never sought and never obtained for the 1662 partus law, the 1868 14th Amendment, or any instrument in the 14-name reclassification chain.
The United States confirmed in its own diplomatic record that this protection could not simply be set aside. The Foreign Relations of the United States record for 1939 establishes two facts the State Department cannot walk back: the Madrid Convention "has no terminable date" (FRUS 1939 Vol. IV, Doc. 725), and terminating Article 15 required a separate naturalization treaty — which the State Department drafted and enclosed with that correspondence (Doc. 713) and never concluded. No separate naturalization treaty was ever ratified. Article 15's protection therefore remained in force through 1959 and beyond — confirmed operative by the International Court of Justice in 1952, which held that the 1836 Treaty "remained in force." The treaty class held this protection in law across the entire period their Empire of Morocco nationality was being subjected to instruments purporting to extinguish it. They could not invoke it because the same apparatus that imposed the unlawful naturalization removed both preconditions for assertion: the recognized identity as subjects of the Empire of Morocco, erased through the 14-name reclassification chain, and the consular forum through which the Article 15 election could be made, which never existed in the Americas and was closed by PL 856 in 1956. A protection made impossible to assert while never being lawfully terminated is the internationally wrongful act. The current proceedings before C24, IACHR, and OHCHR reconstitute the forum through which Article 15's un-terminated protection is asserted for the first time.
On March 17, 1959, the United States State Department addressed a note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the post-independence Kingdom of Morocco. The note stated that "in line with historical developments Article XV of the Madrid Convention on Protection of 1880 has become obsolete and without effect." That note presents four unsolvable legal problems. First, it was addressed to the Kingdom of Morocco, which came into existence in 1956 — not to the Empire of Morocco, whose authority under the 1880 Madrid Convention predates and is constitutionally independent of the 1956 arrangement. The Kingdom of Morocco cannot consent on behalf of the Empire to extinguish the treaty class's nationality. Second, the note is a unilateral executive statement; Senate-ratified treaties require a Senate-ratified instrument or an act of Congress to terminate. Third, it purports to terminate a protection the United States' own 1939 record confirms "has no terminable date" by the only method the United States identified — a separate naturalization treaty — that was never concluded. Fourth, Vienna Convention Article 62 bars a state from invoking changed circumstances it created itself; the reclassification of the treaty class was the US-created condition cited as the reason for "obsolescence." The note's own language is also an admission: the United States says it "unilaterally relinquished certain rights in Morocco." A right the United States admits existed was never lawfully terminated.
H.Res.251 (2025), introduced in the US House of Representatives during the same Congressional session in which AEA enforcement against treaty class members is proceeding, calls the 1836 Treaty "the longest unbroken diplomatic relationship in United States history." The 1836 Treaty and the 1880 Madrid Convention both apply to the same treaty class under the same Empire of Morocco counterparty relationship. A Congressional resolution affirming that relationship as unbroken cannot be reconciled with a 1959 executive note declaring the nationality protection of that relationship obsolete. Both cannot simultaneously be the operative legal position.
Article 21 of the 1836 Treaty is real law. The Arabic controlling text makes the class broader than the English translation shows. Understanding the right matters — but the enforcement pathway is top-down, through international forums, not through lower US courts first. That distinction is the difference between building a case and walking into a trap.
Article 21 of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship (8 Stat. 484, 1836) states:
"If a citizen of the United States should kill or wound a Moor, or, on the contrary, if a Moor shall kill or wound a citizen of the United States, the law of the Country shall take place, and equal justice shall be rendered, the Consul assisting at the trial; and if any delinquent shall make his escape, the Consul shall not be answerable for him in any manner whatever."— Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Article 21, 1836 (8 Stat. 484) — English text
That is the English translation. The Arabic controlling text says something broader — and something more precise. The US government's own commissioned Arabist, C. Snouck Hurgronje — whose analysis appears in the official US treaty compilation (Hunter Miller, Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, Vol. IV, GPO 1934) — found the English rendering of Article 21 "extremely inept." The same Arabic word translated correctly as "Moslems" in Articles 3, 6, and 10 of the same treaty was mistranslated as "Moor" in Article 21. The Arabic word is Muslimin. Understanding what that word meant in 1836 is the key to understanding what was taken.
In 1836, "Muslimin" did not mean private religious belief. It meant political-national standing under the Sultan's authority. The Moroccan Sultanate operated under Maliki jurisprudence, in which there was no separation between religious identity and political standing — the Sultan was simultaneously the temporal sovereign and Amir al-Mu'minin, Commander of the Faithful. Being "Muslimin" meant you were a subject of that unified authority. Religion and nationhood were the same thing. The treaty itself confirms this: Article 3 establishes the governing binary — "a Moslem or a Christian." That is not a distinction between two private beliefs. It is a distinction between two political-legal jurisdictions. The Moslem falls under the Sultan's law. The Christian falls under Christian sovereign law. These are jurisdictional categories, not confessional ones. The same logic operated in early American law: Virginia's 1667 Act used Christian baptism as a marker of civil status — "Christian" was a legal-political category with civil consequences, not a spiritual preference. "Muslimin" carried the same weight on the other side of that binary.
This is why the translation of "Muslimin" as "Moor" was not just a language error — it was a suppression mechanism. "Moor" is an ethnic category: North African, Moroccan, Berber-descended. Ethnic categories can be reclassified. The 14-name chain (Moor → Negro → Colored → Black → African American) operated entirely on ethnic and racial categories. Once the treaty class was defined by ethnic origin rather than political-national standing, the reclassification engine could work. Political-national standing under a treaty cannot be reclassified by census instruction. You cannot issue a census directive that converts treaty subjects into domestic nationals. But if the category is ethnic, the census replacement works. If the category is political-national, it does not — because political standing is determined by treaty law, not by census instruction. The colonial suppression exploited the post-Westphalian Western concept of religion/state separation — a concept that did not exist in the Moroccan Sultanate's legal framework — to retroactively convert a political-national class into a private belief category that could then be dismissed as irrelevant to treaty standing.
The SC/GA Sea Islands Muslim communities — Bilali Mohammed on Sapelo Island, Salih Bilali on St. Simons Island, the entire population that preserved Friday prayers and Maliki legal practice for generations — fall within "Muslimin" by the Arabic treaty text. Bilali Mohammed preserved the Risala of Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani — the foundational Maliki jurisprudence text of the Sultan's courts — in Arabic, on Sapelo Island, ca. 1800–1860. That is not evidence of private spiritual practice. That is evidence of active engagement with the Sultan's legal-political framework. He was not preserving a prayer book. He was preserving the legal code of his sovereign. The English "Moor" could exclude him by arguing he was not ethnically Moroccan-descended. The Arabic "Muslimin" cannot exclude him by any argument the colonial classification system had available. One final note: this does not mean every modern Muslim is a treaty class member. The argument is about the political-national standing of those classified as "Muslimin" in 1836 and the documented suppression of that standing through the name chain. Modern religious identity is a separate matter. What was taken was not a religion — it was a nationality.
The right is real. Article 21 names a specific procedural obligation — "the Consul assisting at the trial" — that exists in a Senate-ratified treaty confirmed operative by the International Court of Justice in 1952. H.Res.251, introduced in the US House of Representatives in 2025, states the treaty "remains the longest unbroken diplomatic relationship in United States history." The United States' own record acknowledges the treaty is in force. The obligation has never been terminated. The problem is not whether the right exists in law — it does. The problem is that two deliberate preconditions for asserting it were both removed: the recognized identity and the functioning consul. Without both, the right exists in the treaty and nowhere else.
And yet: for 190 years, in every criminal proceeding involving a treaty class member classified as "Black" or "African American," no Consul has assisted at trial. Not once. This is not because the right did not exist. It is because two preconditions for invoking it were both deliberately removed. First, the 14-name reclassification chain erased the recognized identity — a person classified as "Negro" or "Black" under the colonial apparatus could not present as a Moroccan subject to invoke Article 21, because the predicate identity had been taken. Second, the Empire of Morocco's consular apparatus was dismantled — PL 856 (1956) closed the last consular courts, and the Empire of Morocco government structure was never reconstituted. Without a recognized identity and without a functioning consul, the right existed in law and was inaccessible in fact. The same pattern as Article 15. The same engineering.
This is why walking into a lower US court today and asserting an Article 21 right is not the correct first move. Lower US courts have no institutional framework for pre-constitutional treaty class status. They have categorically dismissed every similar assertion — not on the merits, but by labeling it as sovereign citizen ideology. Not one of those dismissals ever engaged the treaty text. They did not need to, because the identity suppression architecture ensured the claim arrived in court without the recognition framework that would have compelled a merits analysis. The result for the treaty class member who tries to assert this today, without that framework, is predictable: the court sees a Black American invoking a treaty most judges have never heard of, with no consul present, no recognized identity documentation, and no prior international forum ruling on record. The assertion is dismissed. In some instances, the person is worse off for having raised it.
The enforcement pathway is top-down. The work happening right now — before the UN Committee on Decolonization (C24), before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR P-1365-26, filed), before the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR h6a662eo) — is the Article 21 enforcement pathway. International recognition of the treaty class's status changes the evidentiary landscape in domestic courts. An IACHR ruling, a C24 statement, an ICJ confirmation: these are not optional preludes. They are the instruments that make domestic court engagement on the merits unavoidable, because they remove the "sovereign citizen" dismissal by establishing the claim at the level of international law first. The obligation in Article 21 is on the United States — but the mechanism for compelling the United States to honor it runs through international forums before domestic courts can be expected to follow.
Every criminal proceeding against a treaty class member where Article 21 is not honored is a separate, documentable, ongoing treaty breach — and every such instance strengthens the record before C24, IACHR, and OHCHR. The 190-year breach chain is what those forums are hearing. Article 21 is the right. The international record is how it is enforced.
The Alien Enemies Act is being enforced today. The treaty class holds a two-part defense that the four suppression systems ensured they would never know existed. The defense is available in any proceeding, right now.
The Alien Enemies Act (50 U.S.C. § 21), enacted July 6, 1798, eight days before the Sedition Act of July 14, 1798, authorizes the President to act against "subjects of the hostile nation or government." The AEA requires three conditions simultaneously: (1) declared war or threatened invasion, (2) alien status (foreign national), and (3) subject of the hostile nation. Condition three fails for every Empire of Morocco treaty class member. The Empire of Morocco is not a hostile nation.
H.Res.251, introduced in the US House of Representatives on March 25, 2025, the same Congressional session during whose term AEA enforcement is proceeding, states that the Treaty of Peace and Friendship "remains the longest unbroken diplomatic relationship in United States history" and affirms America's commitment to peace and cooperation with the treaty partner. A Congress whose own record describes the Empire of Morocco treaty relationship as unbroken peace and friendship cannot simultaneously enforce the AEA, which applies to hostile nations, against subjects of that nation. The statutory text excludes the treaty class. The Congressional record confirms the exclusion.
The 1798 Twenty-Day Triple-Play: The AEA (July 6, 1798) was enacted eleven days after the Alien Friends Act (June 25, 1798), the parallel statute governing friendly aliens, and eight days before the Sedition Act (July 14, 1798). Moroccan subjects were "alien friends" under the 1786 Treaty (ratified 1787), the Alien Friends Act, not the AEA, was the applicable statute. The colonial suppression architecture ensured the treaty class did not know this in 1798. The education suppression ensured they did not know it in 2025.
WWII confirmation of the gap: Presidential Proclamations 2525 (Japan), 2526 (Germany), 2527 (Italy) were the WWII AEA designations. The Empire of Morocco was not named. FDR personally hosted Mohammed V — the Sultan of the Empire of Morocco — at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, while those proclamations were in force, as an ally. The treaty class was never the "enemy" under AEA enforcement, even at the AEA's maximum historical use.
Article 21 requires a Consul assisting at trial in every proceeding involving the treaty class. That requirement has existed for 190 years, since the 1836 Treaty. It has not been honored once. That 190-year record is not a failure to assert a right — it is the breach chain that is now before three international forums.
The United States argued this treaty before the International Court of Justice in 1952. The judgment was mixed, but it confirmed the 1836 Treaty "remained in force", and having argued the treaty as operative the United States is estopped from now calling it obsolete. Its own Congressional record calls the treaty "the longest unbroken diplomatic relationship in United States history." The obligation in Article 21 is acknowledged in the US's own record. What is also in the US's own record — in every criminal court docket involving the treaty class since 1836 — is the complete absence of any Consul assisting at trial. Not once. Not in 190 years of criminal proceedings against the people the Arabic controlling text of that treaty calls "Muslimin."
That absence is not a gap in the legal argument. It is the legal argument. Every proceeding where Article 21 was not honored is a separate, documentable, contemporaneous treaty breach. That breach chain — 190 years long, still accumulating — is what C24, IACHR P-1365-26, and OHCHR h6a662eo are hearing. The international record does not require the treaty class to walk into a domestic court to prove the breach. The breach is already in the domestic court record. Every docket. Every case. Every year since 1836.
When international recognition establishes the treaty class's standing, domestic courts will face a different evidentiary landscape than they face today. That is the sequence. The international record comes first — because it is the instrument that removes the "sovereign citizen" dismissal mechanism and forces a merits engagement that the domestic courts have never been required to provide.
The UN Special Committee on Decolonization follows a defined process: a written record is submitted, the Committee may issue a resolution, and that recognition renews and compounds over time. Understanding each stage, what it requires and what it creates, is how the claim is read as a decolonization matter rather than dismissed.
C24 is a committee of the UN General Assembly. A favorable C24 recommendation goes to the General Assembly for a vote. A General Assembly resolution, even non-binding, triggers the decolonization monitoring mandate and creates the international political record that shapes state behavior.
Resolution 1514 (1960), The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples
Resolution 1514 was adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 14, 1960. It declares that "the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation." It affirms that "all peoples have the right to self-determination." The Resolution specifically affirms that "inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence", a provision that directly addresses the GEB's deliberate design of inadequate professional education for the treaty class as a mechanism of suppression.
Resolution 1541 (1960), adopted the same day, defines the criteria for a Non-Self-Governing Territory (NSGT): a territory that is "geographically separate and is distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it." The Empire of Morocco treaty class, whose national identity was Moroccan subject, whose administrative territory was Al-Maghrib al-Aqsa, and whose current administrative framework is the United States, satisfies the NSGT criteria. The 1836 Treaty is the primary source of the separate sovereign relationship. The name chain is the documentation of the administrative suppression of that relationship.
A General Assembly resolution under Resolution 1514 affirming Empire of Morocco treaty class rights would authorize the Secretary-General to transmit annual information questionnaires to the United States regarding the treaty class's situation, making the United States' compliance (or non-compliance) with treaty obligations an annual agenda item in the UN system. It would trigger the Decolonization Unit's monitoring mandate. It would authorize the C24 to invite civil society representatives annually. It would authorize UN Special Rapporteurs to make country visit requests specifically on treaty class issues. The resolution creates a legal and political infrastructure that compounds annually, the same infrastructure that has made Puerto Rico's colonial status a permanent item in the international record for 54 years.
The distinction between those two routes, civil rights and treaty, determines what outcomes are actually available and which ceiling applies.
The UN's own accounting framework for treaty violation remedy, the Articles on State Responsibility, adopted by the UN General Assembly, applies to 190 years of breach. The financial dimension is not a political argument. It is a legal calculation.
The international restitution standard establishes the compensation measure for internationally wrongful acts: restitution to wipe out all consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would have existed had the act not been committed. This is a forward-looking, consequence-based calculation, not a backward-looking damages calculation. The question is not "what was lost" in a tort sense, it is "what would exist if the treaty had been honored."
The international restitution standard's "reestablish the situation which would have existed" measure means the financial remedy calculation is not the sum of the four tiers above, it is the projection of what the treaty class community's aggregate wealth position would be today if the 1836 Treaty's protections had been honored for 189 years. That calculation, performed using standard financial modeling with the historical documentation above as inputs, produces the compensation figure. It has not been suppressed. It has not been disputed in any international forum. It has not been calculated. It is pending.
Recognition of the void chain does not require returning territory, dissolving the United States, or any action beyond existing US administrative capacity. These five measures are the minimum the void chain's failure legally compels, the floor below which no recognition order can stop.
Each floor item is legally compelled by existing treaty text or by the international restitution standard. None requires a constitutional amendment. All five have administrative precedents in US government practice, they are things the US has done, or functional equivalents, for other treaty classes.
The UN framework identifies five forms of remedy for human rights violations. All five apply to the treaty class. This is what winning looks like, not as an abstraction, but as specific legal outcomes.
C24. IACHR. Article 21. Each builds on the last. The sequence is in motion. It has already started.
C24 creates the international political record: a UN body has recognized that the treaty class constitutes a people with decolonization rights. That record is referenced by every subsequent forum. The IACHR merits decision creates legal authority: an international human rights body has found that the United States violated specific treaty and human rights obligations to the treaty class. That decision is cited in US federal courts as persuasive authority, the same way the Dann decision was cited for 20 years after the Western Shoshone ruling.
On the day a favorable IACHR merits decision is issued, every treaty class member in any US criminal proceeding has persuasive authority to assert Article 21 of the 1836 Treaty. Every court that receives that assertion must either honor the treaty obligation or create a specific, documented, contemporaneous record of violation. Every violation is additional evidence in the international cases. Every assertion is an act of decolonization.
Recognition is the remedy. From recognition, restoration follows as a legal consequence. You do not need the Kingdom of Morocco's acknowledgment. You do not need the US Congress to pass new legislation. You do not need a new treaty. The treaty exists. The rights vest in the people. The obligation runs to the United States. The sequence has already started.
"Occupation does not extinguish sovereignty."— Governing principle, international law
The suppression of the Empire of Morocco government was real. The 400 years of reclassification were real. The educational design that prevented the professional class from emerging was real. The civil rights room that kept you fighting inside the colonial framework was real. All of it was real.
And none of it extinguished the sovereignty. The rights are intact. The instruments that purported to extinguish them were each void from the moment of issuance. The system that made you forget the noun has been documented, mapped, and is now before international forums. The noun has not changed. You were taught you are the descendants of slaves — that was the system's final instruction. But the word itself was wrong before it was even applied to you. "Slave" derives from "Slav" — it is the name of the Slavic peoples of Eastern Europe, who were enslaved in large numbers during the medieval period, and whose condition became the word. It named one people. It was then applied to another people entirely to erase who they were. You are not the descendants of Slavic peoples. You are not the descendants of slaves. You are the descendants of Moroccan subjects — the first Moroccan Nationals of the Empire of Morocco — who were subjected to enslavement on their own land, within their own sovereign domain. Enslaved is what was done to them. Moroccan subject is who they were. The condition was imposed. The identity was never lawfully removed. The treaty is yours. The way out is through it.